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PLEASE TAKE BACK YOUR HUDDLED MASSES: A LOOK AT THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO ACCESS DEPORTATION 
HEARINGS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 20011 
On September 11, 2001, the American way of life was drastically and 
dramatically altered by a terrorist attack on New York City and America.  
Since that infamous day, President Bush has declared a war against terrorism 
that “has pervaded the sinews of our national life and is reflected in thousands 
of ways in legislative and national policy, the habits of daily living, and our 
collective psyches.”2  Following the attack, a worldwide and domestic 
investigation into the attack and any related terrorist threat to the United States 
was ordered in the name of national security and defense.3  In addition to those 
persons responsible for the terrorist activities, this ongoing investigation 
revealed numerous illegal aliens, primarily of Arab or Muslim background.4  A 
majority of these aliens are “subject to removal from the United States,” and 
have had deportation hearings brought against them.5  The Department of 
Justice, which oversees the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), 
was given the authority to identify aliens whose “situation [is] particularly 
sensitive” and designate their hearings “special interest cases.”6 The 
Department of Justice has not published or made public any of its guidelines or 
methods used in making this “special interest” determination.  But, it is 
speculated that the designated aliens “might have connections with, or possess 
information pertaining to terrorist activities, particularly the September 11th 
hijacking or al Qaeda and associated groups.”7 
 
 1. The title for this piece was inspired by the poem “The New Colossus” by Emma 
Lazarus.  In her famous poem Emma Lazarus celebrated immigration to the United States.  See 
Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, reprinted in 100 KEY DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 214 (Peter B. Levy ed., Greenwood Press 1994).  The full text of the passage is as 
follows: 
Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses, yearning to breath free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, the tempest-tost to me. 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door! 
 2. N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202 (3rd Cir. 2002). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.; Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F.Supp.2d 937, 940 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 5. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 202; Detroit Free Press, 195 F.Supp.2d at 940. 
 6. N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 202.  
 7. Id. 
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The decision to increase security and close these special interest cases to 
the public was articulated on September 21, 2001, in a directive by Chief 
Immigration Judge Michael Creppy (“Creppy Directive”), under the authority 
of Attorney General John Ashcroft.8  This directive, issued to all United States 
Immigration Judges, also contained the guidelines and procedures all 
immigration courts must follow when hearing “special interest cases.”9  These 
guidelines require all proceedings in these “special interest” cases to be 
assigned to immigration judges who hold at least a “secret clearance,”10 and be 
conducted separately from all other cases on the court’s docket.11  
Additionally, the Creppy Directive specifies courtrooms be closed to the press 
and public, including family members and friends.12  This broad restriction 
prevents courtroom personnel from discussing the case with anyone, even 
including, “confirming or denying whether such a case is on the docket or 
scheduled for a hearing.”13  The Creppy Directive also requires that inquiries 
about a case to the INS toll-free number, which normally provides information 
as to the status of a case, will receive only a recorded message informing the 
caller that “information cannot be released regarding this case.”14 
 
 8. Detroit Free Press v. Aschroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media, 308 
F.3d at 202-03; Memorandum from Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to all 
Immigration Judges 1 (August 21, 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/ 
creppy092101memo.pdf (last visited May 17, 2003).  Hearings containing the “special interest” 
designations involve aliens who “might have connections with, or possess information pertaining 
to, terrorist activities against the United States.”  Of particular concern were aliens who had close 
associations with the September 11th hijackers or who themselves have associated with al Qaeda 
or related terrorist groups.  N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 202. 
 9. See Memorandum from Michael Creppy, supra note 8. 
 10. Id. at 2 (Instruction number one states,”Because some of these cases may ultimately 
involve classified evidence, the cases are to be assigned only to judges who currently hold at least 
a secret clearance.”). 
 11. Id. (Instruction number three states, “Each of these cases is to be heard separately from 
all other cases on the docket.”). 
 12. Id. (Instruction number three states, “The courtroom must be closed for these cases—no 
visitors, no family, and no press”). 
 13. Id. (Instruction numbers four and five.  Instruction four states, “The Record of 
Proceeding is not to be released to anyone except an attorney or representative who has an EOIR-
28 on file for the case (assuming the file does not contain classified information.)”  Instruction 
five states, “This restriction on information includes confirming or denying whether such a case is 
on the docket or scheduled for a hearing.”).  See also N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 203 
(refers to this as a “complete information blackout along both substantive and procedural 
dimensions.”); NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE ISSUES 
GUIDELINES FOR SECRET REMOVAL HEARINGS (2001), at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/ 
removpsds/removpsds072.htm (last visited on March 29, 2003). 
 14. Memorandum from Michael Creppy, supra note 8, at 2-3 (Instruction six states, “The 
ANSIR record for the case is to coded to ensure that information about the case is not provided on 
the 1-800 number and the case is not listed on the court calendars posted outside the courtrooms.  
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After the Creppy Directive was released, two federal appellate cases, both 
attacking the constitutionality of the Creppy Directive under the First 
Amendment, were decided.15  In the first case, Detroit Free Press v. Aschcroft, 
the Sixth Circuit held the Creppy Directive was unconstitutional.  In the second 
case, North Jersey Media Group v. Aschcroft, the Third Circuit created a 
circuit split by holding the Creppy Directive was constitutional.  This note will 
first examine the federal government’s power to regulate immigration and the 
judicial history of the First Amendment access rights that limits this power.  
Secondly, both appellate court cases will be discussed in length. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Federal Government’s Power to Regulate Immigration 
To fully understand the Creppy memo and its impact on American 
immigration procedure and law, it is important to have some background 
information regarding the federal government’s powers in controlling 
immigration.  When addressing the constitutional limitations on actions taken 
by the federal government, it is first necessary to determine the constitutional 
source of the power.16  Both historically and recently there has been much 
debate over the federal government’s power to regulate immigration.17  But, 
due to the limits of this note, this issue will be only briefly discussed.18 
 
See also the Procedures for ANSIR Coding and Marking ROP, the 1-800 number.”).  See also 
National Immigration Law Center, Chief Immigration Judge Issues Guidelines for Secret 
Removal Hearings, 15(8) IMMIGRANTS’ RTS. UPDATE 1 (2001), at http://www.nilc.org/ 
immlawpolicy/removpsds/removpsds072.htm (last visited on March 29, 2003). 
 15. Both North Jersey Media and Detroit Free Press were filed in part by media 
organizations who want to publicize the names and information revealed in the hearing. 
 16. Professor Joel Goldstein instilled this approach to constitutional issues in me during 
Constitutional Law my first year of law school.  Since the federal government is one of 
enumerated powers, the first analysis is to determine under what provision of the constitution the 
government is acting, and whether their actions have gone beyond the power vested in the 
constitution.  Only after determining this issue is it okay to continue analyzing violations of 
specific constitutional rights. 
 17. Most of the debates and articles concern discrimination and not allowing aliens to enter 
the United States.  The discrimination tactics have been employed by both the federal government 
and the states - particularly Miami with Cuban refugees and southern states like California and 
Texas trying to limit the number of Mexican immigrants allowed into the states. 
 18. See generally Marisa Ann Tostado, Comment, Alienation: Congressional Authorization 
of State Discrimination Against Immigrants, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1033 (1998); Philip Brashier, 
Comment, The United States Struggles with Past Judicial Interpretations in Defining the Modern 
Law of Immigration, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1357 (1996); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century Of 
American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993) 
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Congress’s Power to Pass Immigration Legislation 
There have been several critics who claim the federal government does not 
have the power to regulate immigration because the Constitution does not 
explicitly grant this power to the federal government.19  The logic behind this 
argument is that the federal government was founded on the theory of 
enumerated powers, the Constitution clearly articulates Congress was given 
only the legislative powers “herein granted,”20 and any “power not delegated to 
the federal government is reserved for the states.”21  Therefore, the argument 
concludes, Congress does not have the power to pass legislation regulating 
immigration.  However, the Constitution also textually grants the federal 
government the authority to create “uniform rules of naturalization.”22  In 
addition to this constitutional clause, courts have used the Commerce Clause, 
and the theory of sovereign immunity as a basis for the federal power to 
regulate immigration.23 
Jurisprudentially, “the government’s authority over immigration was first 
announced more than one hundred years ago in ‘The Chinese Exclusion 
Case.’” 24  The court determined the authority to regulate immigration came 
not from an “express provision of the Constitution but from powers incident to 
sovereignty.”25  Since that decision, the United States Supreme Court has time 
and again concluded that the federal government has a near unrestrained ability 
to control immigration.26  In its holdings the Court has relied heavily on policy 
issues; particularly the importance of the government controlling immigration 
 
 19. See Margaret Warner, Liberty v. Security, PBS ONLINE NEWSHOUR, August 27, 2002, at 
1. 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. I; Brashier, supra note 18, at 1389 n.17. 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Brashier, supra note 18, at n.17. 
 22. U.S. CONST. art I, §8, cl. 4; Tostado, supra, note 18. 
 23. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); Tostado, supra note 18, at 1040. 
 24. “The court recounted the strife following Chinese immigration to California after the 
gold rush of the mid 1800’s.  A convention of lawmakers in California petitioned Congress to 
alleviate this ‘problem’.  The petition charged among other things that the presence of Chinese 
laborers had a baneful effect upon the material interests of the state, and upon public morals; that 
there immigration was in numbers approaching the character of an oriental invasion, and was a 
menace to our civilization.”  The court held that “if the government . . . considers the presence of 
foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to 
its peace and security,” this “determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.” Detroit Free Press, 
303 F.3d at 685-86 (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)). 
 25. Id. at 686. 
 26. Id. at 682-83.  The Court has, historically, given great deference to the federal 
government in deciding who, and for what substantive reason someone should be deported.  See, 
e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 528, 531 (1954) (holding Congress can deport former 
member of communist party even if they personally did not advocate the violent overthrow of the 
Government); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (courts cannot limit 
Congress from expelling “aliens whose race or habits render them undesirable as citizens”). 
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policy, because it affects the foreign treaties the government enters into and 
thereby affecting international relations.27  Therefore, as a result of the 
Constitution and judicial principle of stare decisis, the federal government 
clearly has the power to regulate immigration. 
The Executive Branch’s Power to Control Immigration 
With the codification of the Immigration Reform, Accountability and 
Security Enhancement Act of 2002, it appears that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security has taken over some immigration enforcement duties from the 
Attorney General.28  Even after the enactment of this statute, the executive 
branch and probably the Attorney General still maintain control over the 
enforcement of all laws surrounding immigration and naturalization.29  
However, this memo will only focus on the power Attorney General Ashcroft 
possessed at the time the Creppy Directive was issued, before the enactment of 
the Immigration Reform, Accountability and Security Enhancement Act of 
2002. 
Congress, using its authority to regulate immigration, passed the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, which charged the Attorney General, at the 
 
 27. Tostado, supra note 18, at 1042. 
 28. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)(2003) stating: 
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and 
enforcement of this chapter and all laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of 
aliens, EXCEPT insofar as this chapter or such laws relate to the powers, functions, and 
duties conferred upon the President, Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the officers 
of the Department of State, or diplomatic or consular officers: Provided, however, That 
determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all question of law shall 
be controlling (emphasis added). 
 29. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)(2003) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be 
charged with this chapter and all laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens, 
EXCEPT insofar as this chapter or such laws relate to the powers, functions, and duties conferred 
upon the President, Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the officers of the Department of 
State, or diplomatic or consular officers: Provided, however, that determination and ruling by the 
Attorney General with respect to all question of law shall be controlling” (emphasis added)  with  
8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(1) (2003) (“The Attorney General shall have such authorities and functions 
under this chapter and all other laws relating to immigration and naturalization of aliens as were 
exercised by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, or by the Attorney General with 
respect to the Executive Office for Immigration Review on or before the effective date of the 
Immigration Reform, Accountability and Security Enhancement Act of 2002”) and 8 U.S.C. 
§1103 (g)(2) (2003) (“The Attorney General shall establish such regulations, prescribe such forms 
of bond, reports, entries, and other papers, issue such instructions, review such administrative 
determinations in immigration proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such other acts 
as the Attorney General determines to be necessary for carrying out this section.”).  Even though 
this issue seems convoluted under the present statute, it appears that 8 U.S.C. §1103(g)(2) is a 
catch-all and would still grant the Attorney General the power to issue the Creppy Directive. 
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time the Creppy Directive was issued, with “administration and enforcement” 
of “all . . . laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens.”30  The 
act further “authorized the Attorney General to deport aliens for a variety of 
reasons,” but generally for entering the United States without an inspection.31 
There are several general classes of deportable aliens, some of which 
include criminal activity32 and subversive activity.33  Additionally, the 
Attorney General was also permitted to prescribe “such regulations . . . as he 
deems necessary for carrying out his authority,”34 and to establish immigration 
judges and removal proceedings under the control of the executive branch.35 
Pursuant to his authority, the Attorney General first established a 
regulation in 1965 mandating that “all hearings, other than exclusion hearings, 
shall be open to the public.”36  However, under this regulation the immigration 
judge may limit the number of people in attendance or close the hearings to 
protect “witnesses, parties or the public interest.”37  “The Creppy Directive was 
issued pursuant to this regulation” and with a purpose of protecting the public 
interest.”38 
 
 30. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 202 n.1 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994)).  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (2003):  “The Attorney General shall establish such regulations . . . as the 
Attorney General determines to be necessary for carrying out this section”). 
 31. N Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 202-03 n.1 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §1251(1994)). 
 32. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(I) (2003):  “Any alien who is convicted of a convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the case of an alien 
provided lawful permanent resident status. . .) after the date of admission and is convicted of a 
crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed is deportable;” 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(1)(B)(2003); “Any alien who is present in the United States in violation of this chapter or 
any other law of the United States is deportable.” 
 33. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(4)(A)(iii) (2003):  “Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at 
any time after admission engages in . . . any activity or purpose for which is the opposition to, or 
the control or overthrow of, the Government of the United States by force, violence or other 
unlawful means is deportable.”  Additional reasons for deportation include: 8 U.S.C. § 1227 
(a)(1) (“inadmissible at time of entry or of adjustment of status or violates statute”); 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2) (“criminal offenses”); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3) (“failure to register and falsification of 
certain documents”); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4) (“security and related grounds”); 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(5) (“public charge”); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6) (“unlawful voters”). 
 34. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3).  It appears as if this duty now falls under the duty of the Secretary 
of Homeland Security.  
 35. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 203 n.1. 
 36. 8 CFR § 3.27 (2002); N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 203 n.1.  The Attorney 
General first promulgated this regulation in 1964 and it has remained substantially unchanged 
ever since. 
 37. 8 CFR § 3.27:  The immigration judge may also limit the number of people in attendance 
or close the hearings: (1) due to the “physical facilities . . . with priority given to the press over 
the general public;” or (2) those “involving an abused alien spouse . . . [or] an abused alien 
child”). 
 38. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 204 n.1. 
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Also, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General 
created the position of Chief Immigration Judge, who is responsible for the 
“general supervision, direction, and scheduling of [all] the Immigration 
Judges.”39  Additionally, the Chief Immigration Judge is responsible for the 
establishment of operational policies and the performance evaluations of the 
Immigration Courts.40  Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued his 
famous directive pursuant to this regulation. 
In conclusion, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy and Attorney 
General John Aschroft were well within their powers to issue the Creppy 
Directive.  Therefore, the remaining issue is whether the Creppy Directive is 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment because of its restrictions on the 
public’s right of access to deportation hearings. 
JUDICIAL PRECEDENT ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS 
Supreme Court Precedent: The Watershed Cases 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has only addressed the issue of a First 
Amendment right of access in criminal proceedings and their holdings have 
been criticized as having “fundamental inconsistencies.”41 These 
inconsistencies have caused the Court to waiver on the “scope, timing, 
constitutional source and purpose of a right of public access to trials,” which in 
turn has confused lower courts.42  Initially, the Court struggled with a 
mechanism to balance the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury and a public trial with the media’s First Amendment right of access.43  
One method lower courts employed to restrict the media’s access to criminal 
trials was the imposition of “gag orders,” which restricted the information the 
press could print.44  These “gag orders” were later held to be unconstitutional.  
 
 39. 8 CFR §3.9. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Kathleen K. Olson, Courtroom Access After 9/11: A Pathological Perspective, 7 COMM. 
L. & POL’Y 461, 473 (2002); Lewis F. Weakland, Confusion in the Courthouse: The Legacy of 
the Gannett and Richmond Newspapers Public Right of Access Cases, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 
603 (1986). 
 42. Olson, supra note 41, at 475. 
 43. Id. at 474.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. . .”). The right exists at both the 
federal and state court level because of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (Fourteenth Amendment extends Sixth Amendment rights to state trials); 
Near v. Minn. ex. rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (Fourteenth Amendment protects First 
Amendment rights from state action). 
 44. Olson, supra note 41, at 474.  See Neb. Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) 
(prohibiting the press from printing certain information from a trial was prior restraint and 
violated the First Amendment). 
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As a result, trial judges, attempting to limit the press’s access to criminal trials, 
began to exclude the press from the courtroom.45 
Gannett v. DePasquale was the first of several Supreme Court cases that 
addressed the issue of the public’s First Amendment right to access.46  In 
Gannett, the public and press were excluded from a pretrial hearing, on an 
unopposed motion by the defense, because of the concern that an “unabated 
buildup of adverse publicity had jeopardized the ability for a fair trial.”47  
While a majority of the Justices concurred in the outcome of the case, four of 
the five Justices disagreed with the method employed in reaching the 
holding.48  The Court held that closure of a pretrial hearing was constitutional, 
based on the Sixth Amendment’s public trial provision.49  In reaching this 
conclusion, “the Court admitted to a common law rule of open civil and 
criminal proceedings and a strong societal interest in public trials, but held that 
public access did not rise to the level of a constitutional right under the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.”50  The majority and dissenting opinions failed 
to decide whether the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment gave the 
public a right of access by assuming such a right existed and that the trial judge 
had taken it into account.51  The Court then concluded that even if such a right 
had existed, that right was outweighed by the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair trial.52  The Court’s ruling signaled that courtroom closures 
would be tolerated.  Trial courts were eager to take advantage of the Supreme 
Court ruling and in the year after Gannett more than a hundred cases resulting 
from closed courtrooms were filed.53 
One year to the day after the Gannett decision, the Supreme Court decided 
what has become known as the watershed case for the First Amendment right 
 
 45. Olson, supra note 41, at 474. 
 46. Id. at 475. 
 47. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 375 (1979). 
 48. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 370 (Stewart, J, majority opinion), 394 (Burger, C.J., 
concurring), 397 (Powell, J., concurring), 403 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).  Justice Pottor Stewart 
wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justice Stevens.  Chief Justice Warren Burger and 
Justices Powell and Rehnquist all wrote separate concurring opinions. All but Stevens wrote 
separate opinions. 
 49. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 394; Olson, supra note 41 at 474. 
 50. Olson, supra note 41, at 475 (citing Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383, 384) (internal citation 
removed). 
 51. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980); Gannett, 443 U.S. at 392, 
447:  “to the extent of recognizing a First and Fourteenth Amendment right to attend criminal 
trials . . . [w]e need not decide . . . whether there is any such constitutional right.”  The court also 
concluded that if such a right existed this right “was given all appropriate deference by the state 
. . . court in the present case”); Olson, supra note 41, at 475. 
 52. Olson, supra note 41, at 457. 
 53. Id. at 476. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] PLEASE TAKE BACK YOUR HUDDLED MASSES 601 
 
of courtroom access, Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia.54  In Richmond 
Newspapers, the Court for the first time recognized a First Amendment right of 
the public and the press to attend criminal trials.55  This holding was significant 
because unlike earlier prison access cases, the court recognized the public had 
a First Amendment right of access to governmental information.56  The Court 
further concluded that the public’s First Amendment right of access was 
independent of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.57 
In this case, the defendant, accused of murdering a hotel manager in 
Virginia, was undergoing his fourth trial for the same murder.58  The judge 
closed the courtroom under the authority of the state law and presumably under 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gannett.  The excluded newspapers appealed.59  
Chief Justice Warren Burger, in a plurality opinion, defined the issue to be 
addressed as, “whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon 
the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure 
is required to protect the defendant’s [Sixth Amendment] right to a fair trial, or 
that some other overriding consideration requires closure.”60  The Court 
distinguished Gannett because it addressed the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights, not the public’s First Amendment access right, and the setting was a 
pretrial hearing opposed to a trial.61  The Richmond Court ultimately held that 
 
 54. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 555; Gannett, 443 U.S. at 368; Olson, supra note 41, 
at 476. 
 55. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 583 (White, J., concurring); Daniel J. Solove, Access 
and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution,  86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1201 
(2002); Olson, supra note 41 at 476. 
 56. Olson, supra note 41, at 476.  See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (no First 
Amendment constitutional right of access to state prisons); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 
843, 850 (1974) (no constitutional right of access to federal prisons). 
 57. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.18.  The Court held a First Amendment right 
of access existed independently of the defendants Sixth Amendment rights.  The problem was the 
Court never articulated a clear standard to determine when the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights outweighed the First Amendment rights of the public. 
 58. Id. at 559-60.  The police arrested a man and tried him for murder.  During his fourth 
trial (the first had been reversed on appeal, and the second and third were declared mistrials), the 
defendant’s counsel moved that the trial be closed to the public to avoid yet another instance of 
jury contamination.  The prosecutor had no objections, so the judge ordered “that the courtroom 
be kept clear of all parties except the witnesses when they testify.”  Two newspaper reporters 
sought to vacate the closure order on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the court had made 
no evidentiary findings prior to issuing its order and also had failed to consider other, less 
dramatic measures within its power to ensure a fair trial. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 563-64; Olson, supra note 41, at 476. 
 61. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564; Olson, supra note 41, at 476. 
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the “First Amendment required that criminal trials be open to the public unless 
there is an overriding interest articulated in the findings by the court.”62 
Despite its watershed status, the seven concurring justices “were too 
divided to establish a clear cut doctrine of courtroom access.”63  This division 
and the resulting seven separate opinions left this new First Amendment right 
of access without a clear definition.64  Chief Justice Burger’s plurality opinion 
and Justice Brennan’s concurrence emerged as the two principle opinions in 
the case.65  Both opinions relied on a two-pronged analysis, with a historical 
prong and a functional or structural prong, to determine if a First Amendment 
right of access existed in a criminal trial.66 
While these two principal opinions are similar, they disagree as to where to 
place the emphasis in the two-prong test.  Burger’s plurality opinion focused 
heavily on the historical analysis while Brennan’s concurrence focused heavily 
on the functional role of the courts.67 
In his opinion, Burger took a more historical approach to the issue and 
therefore placed more emphasis on history, both to understand the traditions 
upon which the Constitution was built and for determining its functional role.68  
Burger treated the issue more narrowly than Justice Brennan because he 
limited the First Amendment’s right of access to criminal proceedings that 
were traditionally open.69 
However, Burger also realized this history of openness was not enough to 
establish a First Amendment right of access and it was also necessary to 
 
 62. Olson, supra note 41, at 467-77.  See Richmond Newspaper, 448 U.S. at 580, 581. 
 63. Olson, supra note 41, at 477. 
 64. Id.; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 555, 581.  Only Justice Rehnquist dissented, but 
there were five concurring opinions.  Justice Powell did not participate in the case. 
 65. Olson, supra note 41, at 477. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 477, 479. 
 68. Id. at 477.  See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 565-73.  Throughout Burger’s 
opinion his emphasis on history is clear.  In his opinion, Burger wrote: “historical evidence 
demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials 
both here and in England had long been presumptively open.”  He also traced the history of the 
Anglo-American law from before the Norman Conquest to the time of the trial and found an 
“unbroken, uncontradicted history” of public access.  Additionally, he could not find a single 
instance of a criminal trial conducted in secret in any federal, state, or municipal court during the 
history of this country.  See also, Olsen, supra note 41, at 477:  “His opinion traced the history of 
the criminal trial from before the Norman Conquest in England and concluded that, ‘throughout 
its evolution, the trial has been open to all who cared to observe.’” 
 69. Olson, supra note 41, at 477.  Logically it makes sense that an emphasis on the historical 
prong would narrow the scope.  Events or hearings that have a short history would not be open to 
the public and therefore would never enjoy a First Amendment right of access.  However, these 
same hearings would be open if the openness served a functional and beneficial purpose, even if 
they enjoyed only a short history of openness. 
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determine the function that openness served in the court proceeding.70  
However, even in his functional analysis, Burger still placed great emphasis on 
history.  He concluded that courtroom access should be protected by the First 
Amendment because the “Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of 
the long history of trials being presumptively open [and] [p]ublic access . . . 
was regarded as an important aspect of the process.”71  Burger further analyzed 
that open public trials have traditionally had a functional “therapeutic value” to 
the public.72  Open trials prevent vigilantism by providing “an outlet for 
community concern, hostility, and emotion,” as well as increasing the public’s 
confidence in the justice systems operation.73  Additionally, the public 
oversight of trials ensures that fairness prevails by “discouraging perjury, the 
misconduct of participant, and judicial decisions based on secret bias or 
partiality.”74  As a result of all these factors, Burger recognized the right to 
attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment and 
“absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case 
must be open to the public.”75 
In his concurrence, “Brennan agreed that history was important to the 
analysis, both because the Constitution bears the ‘gloss’ of history and because 
‘the case for a right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring 
and vital tradition of public entrée to particular proceedings or information.’”76  
Brennan also echoed Burger’s functional purposes for courtroom access and its 
importance in assuring judicial fairness, providing a societal outlet, and 
furthering “the particular public purpose of that critical judicial proceeding.”77  
However, because of Brennan’s structural model of the First Amendment, his 
concurrence placed more emphasis on and went further in analyzing the 
functional role of open trials.78  In Brennan’s view, “the primary value of a 
 
 70. Olson, supra note 41, at 476.  “A common law tradition of openness . . . would not be 
sufficient standing alone.” 
 71. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576, stating: 
[t]he Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the long history of trials being 
presumptively open.  Public access to trials was then regarded as an important aspect of 
the process itself . . . .  In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of the speech and press, the 
First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to 
give meaning to those explicit guarantees. 
 72. Olson, supra note 41, at 476. 
 73. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571, 572; Olson, supra note 41, at 477. 
 74. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569. 
 75. Id. at 581. 
 76. Olson, supra note 41, at 478 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, 
J., concurring)). 
 77. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 592, 595-96 (Brennan, J., concurring); Olson, supra 
note 41, at 479. 
 78. Olson, supra note 41, at 479. 
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public trial lay in its place in the constitutional framework, and the historical 
evidence served to confirm the importance of that role.”79 
Brennan’s concurrence views the First Amendment as playing a structural 
role in “securing and fostering our republican system of self-government,”80 as 
well as being a “commitment to free expression for its own sake.”81  A 
keystone principle to Brennan’s structural model is not only should “debate on 
public issues . . . be uninhibited, robust, and wide open . . . but also . . . 
informed.”82  This expansion of the Court’s traditional speech model not only 
prohibits interfering with the communication itself, but also protects “the 
indispensable conditions of meaningful communication.”83  Thus, “trial access 
possesses specific structural significance” because the judicial branch is a 
“coordinate branch of the government,” and information about its workings is 
critical for the proper functioning of our democracy.84 
The drawback of Brennan’s structural model is that “the stretch of . . . 
protection is theoretically endless.”85  Consequentially, the public’s access to 
information could expand beyond government-related information “to any type 
of information a free society may require for informed public discussion.”86  
To overcome this drawback, Brennan determined that the “right to gather 
information in a particular case must be weighed against [any] countervailing 
interests with the guidance of two helpful principles: an examination of the 
tradition of openness for the particular proceeding and an assessment of the 
specific structural value of public access in the circumstances.”87  In deciding 
if a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials existed, Brennan 
reasoned that a court “must consult historical and current practice with respect 
to open trials, and weigh the importance of public access to the trial process 
itself.”88  He, therefore, concluded that closing trials violates the First 
Amendment because criminal trials have “historically been open and, more 
 
 79. Id. at 480-81. 
 80. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring); Olson, supra note 41, 
at 479. 
 81. Olson, supra note 41, at 479. 
 82. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Olson, supra note 41, at 480 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 593-94). 
 85. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588. 
 86. Olson, supra note 41, at 480.  Indeed, such a right has been expounded by legal 
commentators over the years, although it has not been adopted in any general way by the court.  
See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1; 
James C. Goodale, Legal Pitfalls in the Right to Know, 1976 A.B.A. J. 667 (1959); Eric G. Olsen, 
Note, The Right to Know in first Amendment Analysis, 57 TEX. L. REV. 505 (1979). 
 87. Olson, supra note 41, at 480.  See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588-89 (Brennan, 
J., concurring). 
 88. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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significantly, because of the importance of public access to the broader 
purposes of the trial process within the system of self-government.”89 
In summary, Brennan’s structural approach differed from Burger’s more 
functional approach in the amount of value placed on the benefit of having 
public access to criminal trials.90  To Burger, courtroom access is important 
because it directly furthers justice, but this reason may be subordinate to other 
more important values such as national security.91  Brennan agreed that 
“countervailing interests may outweigh the right of access, but his threshold 
for that to occur is much higher than Burger’s.”92 
Supreme Court Precedent: The Trilogy Expanding Richmond Newspapers 
Subsequent to Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court decided three 
more cases dealing with the First Amendment Right of access to court 
proceedings.93  These cases further refined and shaped the test established in 
Richmond Newspapers.94 
The first of these cases was Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, which 
marked another shift in the Court’s approach to this issue.95  In this case, a 
Massachusetts law mandated that the general public and press be excluded 
from criminal trials when juvenile victims of sexual assault testified, in order 
to protect the juvenile’s privacy.96  In holding the state law violated the First 
Amendment, a majority of the Court adopted Brennan’s structural analysis 
from his concurrence in Richmond Newspapers.97 Therefore, the historical 
prong was regulated to a secondary status behind the logic prong.98 
To fulfill the logic prong under Brennan’s analysis, the Court addressed 
“whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of 
 
 89. Olson, supra note 41, at 480. 
 90. See id. at 481. 
 91. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-73; Olson, supra note 41, at 481 (courtroom 
access furthers justice through education, oversight, and catharsis). 
 92. Olson, supra note 41, at 481. 
 93. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at  684 n.5.  The subsequent cases were: Press-Enter. Co. v. 
Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise II]; Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 
U.S. 501(1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I]; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 
(1982). 
 94. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684 n.5. 
 95. Olson, supra note 41, at 481. 
 96. Globe Newspaper, 457 US at 598. 
 97. This formalized what came to be known as the Richmond Newspapers “experience and 
logic” test. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 206. 
 98. Olson, supra note 41, at 481.  See Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 604:  The Court 
acknowledged that “underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the 
common understanding that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs.” 
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the particular process and the government as a whole.”99  According to the 
Court, “public access to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and 
serve as a check upon the judicial process—an essential component in our 
structure of self-government.”100 
The major confusion in Globe arose in Brennan’s approach to the historical 
prong.  In the majority opinion, Brennan affirmed the value of an inquiry into 
historical traditions but seemed to determine that because there was a general 
right of access to criminal trials, the particular type of criminal trials did not 
matter.101  In his dissent, Burger strongly emphasized the history prong and “its 
importance in limiting the right of access where there was no tradition of 
openness.”102  The dissent further criticized the majority’s reading of 
Richmond Newspaper “as spelling out a First Amendment right of access to all 
aspects of all criminal trials under all circumstances . . . plainly incorrect.”103 
Globe was the first case in this series to address and try to provide a 
standard on how to weigh competing interests.  In Richmond Newspapers, the 
court did not give much attention to this issue, and the only standard 
articulated was for the “trial judge to release findings that articulate “an 
overriding interest” in closing the trial.104  In Globe, the Court required the 
application of the strict scrutiny test to a “compelling governmental interest” in 
order to close a courtroom without violating the First Amendment.105  As 
applied, this required the trial judge to show that the “denial is necessitated by 
a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest.”106  Justice Brennan further articulated that this evaluation must be 
 
 99. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 206; Press-Enterprise II,  478 US at 8-9; Globe 
Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 605-06. 
 100. Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 606. 
 101. Id. at 605 n.13:  “In Richmond Newspapers, the Court discerned a First Amendment 
right of access to criminal trials based in part on the recognition that as a general matter criminal 
trials have long been presumptively open.  Whether the First Amendment right of access to 
criminal trials can be restricted in the context of any particular criminal trial, such as a murder 
trial (the setting for the dispute in Richmond Newspapers) or a rape trial, depends not on the 
historical openness of that type of criminal trial but rather on the state interests supporting the 
restriction.”  See also, Olson, supra note 41 at 482. 
 102. Olson, supra note 41, at 482. 
 103. Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 613 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  Burger was joined by 
Justice Rehnquist. 
 104. Olson, supra note 41, at 481 (citing Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 598 (Brennan, J., 
concurring)).  In Richmond Newspapers “Brennan stated that, while examination of 
countervailing interests must be made, the blanket nature of the statute made unnecessary a 
finding of what interests might be sufficiently compelling to weigh against access.” 
 105. Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 606-07; Olson, supra note 41, at 483. 
 106. Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 606-07; Olson, supra note 41, at 483:  “In Globe, the 
Court found the state’s interest in protecting minor victims of sexual offenses from further trauma 
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done “on a case-by-case basis” because “it is clear that the circumstances of 
the particular case may affect the significance of the [government’s] 
interest.”107 
In cases after Globe, the Court extended this First Amendment right to 
access beyond the immediate criminal trial to jury selection as well.108 In 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (“Press-Enterprise I”), the trial court 
restricted public access to the voir dire testimony of prospective jurors in a 
capital murder trial.109  Press-Enterprise moved for a release of the complete 
transcript of the voir dire proceedings after the jury was empaneled and at the 
conclusion of the trial, but the trial court refused because of concern for juror 
privacy since certain sensitive matters were discussed.110  Chief Justice Burger 
once again wrote the opinion for the majority and, while addressing both 
prongs, again placed the majority of the emphasis on the historical analysis.111  
His analysis of the history and logic prongs mirrored his analysis in Richmond 
Newspapers.112  Ultimately, the Court held that there was a “public interest in 
ensuring that jurors are fairly and openly selected and concluded that the trial 
court too broadly closed off access and failed to consider alternatives that were 
available to protect the jurors’ privacy.”113  Burger, agreeing with Brennan in 
Globe, also articulated that the standard for overturning this “presumption of 
openness” was strict scrutiny: “the presumption of openness may be overcome 
only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve those interests.”114  He 
further elaborated on his standard from Richmond Newspapers by requiring 
 
and embarrassment a compelling governmental interest, but found that the mandatory closure 
statute was not narrowly tailored.” 
 107. Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 607-08. 
 108. Solove, supra note 55, at 1202.  See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 511 (holding in 
criminal cases the First Amendment right of access extended to pretrial jury selection 
proceeding). 
 109. Solove, supra note 55, at 1202.  See also Press-Enterprise I, 464 US at 503 (“The trial 
judge. . .permitted [the public] to attend only the general voir dire.  He stated that counsel would 
conduct the individual voir dire with regard to death qualifications and any other special areas 
that counsel may feel some problem with regard to . . . in private.  The voir dire consumed six 
weeks and all but approximately three days were closed to the public.”). 
 110. Solove, supra note 55, at 1202; See Press-Enterprise I, 464 US at 504. 
 111. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 505.  Chief Justice Burger again echoes his plurality 
opinion in Richmond Newspapers by stating, A historical view “reveals that, since the 
development of the trial by jury, the process of selection of jurors has presumptively been a 
public process with exceptions only for good cause shown.” 
 112. Id. at 505-09.  Like in Richmond Newspapers, Burger traces the history of access to pre-
trial jury questioning from before the Norman Conquest to present day.  He also places heavy 
emphasis on the therapeutic effects this history of access has played on the judicial process. 
 113. Solove, supra note 55, at 1202. 
 114. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510. 
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“the interest to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a 
reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly 
entered.”115 
Two years later, the “Court all but overruled its decision in Gannett” when 
it extended the First Amendment right of access to preliminary hearings in 
criminal cases in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (“Press-Enterprise 
II”).116  Chief Justice Burger, again writing for the majority, articulated the two 
“complementary” prongs of the Richmond Newspaper test.117  The first 
“historical” prong considered “whether the place and process have historically 
been open to the press and general public,” because a “tradition of accessibility 
implies the favorable judgment of experiences.”118  The standard articulated by 
the Court for the second “logic” prong is whether “public access plays a 
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in 
question.”119  The Court also recognized that these two prongs of experience 
and logic are related because “both history and experience shape the 
functioning of the governmental process.”120  Despite this relationship, the 
Court still independently applied both prongs of the test.121  The Court further 
reaffirmed its prior holdings by recognizing that a First Amendment access 
right “is not absolute” and may be restricted, but only if the reason for closure 
passes the Globe strict scrutiny test.122 
In summary, Richmond Newspapers and its progeny have laid out a 
doctrine that recognizes a First Amendment right of access to “judicial 
proceedings based upon two primary sources: (1) a history of openness; and 
(2) the structural role of access, through a finding that public access plays a 
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular proceeding in 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Olson, supra note 41, at 484.  See Press-Enterprise II, 478 US at 13 (“We therefore 
conclude that the qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings applies to 
preliminary hearings as they are conducted in California.”).  Compare Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383 
(no right of access in preliminary hearings in criminal cases) with Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 
13 (“the public has a qualified First Amendment right of access to preliminary hearings in 
criminal cases if the historical and structural prongs are satisfied.”). 
 117. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. 
 118. Id.  (quoting Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 605); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 
589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 119. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8 (quoting Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 606). 
 120. Id. at 9.  These considerations of experience and logic are, of course, related, for history 
and experience shape the functioning of governmental process. 
 121. Id. at 10, 11. 
 122. Id. at 9-10: 
The presumption [of openness] may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on 
findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest.  The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a 
reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. 
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question.”123  However, the Court has recognized this “right isn’t absolute and 
must be weighed against countervailing interests.”124  In “balancing 
[countervailing] interests, courts must apply a strict scrutiny standard: the 
interest must be compelling and the closure must be narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest.”125 
 
 123. Olsen, supra note 41, at 484. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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Lower Court Decisions: Expanding the Scope of the Richmond Newspapers 
Doctrine 
Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Richmond Newspapers and its 
progeny, lower courts have applied the two-pronged test.126  Some lower courts 
have expanded the scope of the First Amendment to declare a constitutional 
right of access exists in entrapment hearings, bail hearings, civil cases and 
administrative hearings.127  In deciding these cases, some courts have taken 
Burger’s approach and relied heavily on the historical tradition of openness to 
expand the constitutional right of access.128  As one legal scholar noted, when 
“analyzing the historical tradition of specific proceedings, some [courts] have 
drawn analogies with established proceedings129 or have examined the history, 
however short, of the specific proceeding at issue.”130  Kathleen Olson goes on 
to write, “in areas where public access has clearly not been a tradition in 
American law, such as family court proceedings or grand juries, courts have 
been reluctant to find a presumptive right of access under the First 
Amendment.”131 
 
 126. Id. at 485. 
 127. Solove, supra note 55, at 1202-03.  See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 
(3d Cir. 1982) (entrapment hearings); United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(bail hearings); Publicker Indus. V. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (civil proceedings): 
Westmoreland v. CBS, 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984) (civil proceedings); Rushford v. New Yorker 
Magazine, 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988) (civil proceedings); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. 
v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir 1983) (civil proceedings); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 
1302 (7th Cir 1984) (civil proceedings); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th Cir 1983) 
(civil proceedings); Tribune Co. v. D.M.L., 566 So.2d 1333 (FL. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (applying 
the two prong test to administrative commitment hearings); Herald Co. v. Weisenburg, 455 
N.Y.S.2d 413, aff’d, 59 N.Y.2d 378 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (administrative unemployment benefits 
proceedings). 
 128. Olson, supra note 41, at 485. (citing Criden, 675 F.2d at 557 (extended right of access to 
entrapment hearings based in part on their history of openness); Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1059 
(extended right of access to motion hearings in a corporate litigation case based on the history of 
openness of civil proceedings)). 
 129. Olsen, supra note 41, at 485 (citing First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & 
Review Bd. 784 F.2d 467, 484-85 (3d Cir. 1986) (Adams, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (calling for an analogy between judicial disciplinary proceedings and judicial impeachment 
hearings, which had historically been open); Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 
F.Supp 569 (D. Utah 1985) (analogizing administrative fact-finding proceedings to civil trials, 
which enjoyed a long history of openness, appeal dismissed and judgment below vacated and 
remanded as moot, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987) ). 
 130. Olsen, supra note 41, at 485 (citing First Amendment Coalition, 784 F.2d at 472 (extent 
of access right must be guided by “unique history and function” of 14-year-old Judicial Review 
Board)). 
 131. Olsen, supra note 41, at 485. See, e.g., San Bernardino Co. Dept. of Pub. Soc. Serv. v. 
Super. Ct., 232 Cal. App. 3d 188 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (family court proceeding).  First 
Amendment right of access does not extend to juvenile dependency proceedings, based in part on 
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Other courts, in deciding these types of cases, take Brennan’s approach in 
Richmond Newspapers and Globe and have reduced the importance of 
historical openness and increased the emphasis on the structural value of 
access.132  In United States v. Chagara, the court held that bail reduction 
hearings enjoy a First Amendment right of access because they “attract 
significant public interest, and invite legitimate and healthy public scrutiny,” 
despite lacking the history of openness articulated in Richmond Newspapers.133  
Other courts have elevated the focus on the structural value of access above the 
historical analysis in showing a right of access to, presidential press 
conferences,134 pretrial documents,135 and denying access to discovery 
materials.136 
Lower Court’s Decisions: Applying the Richmond Newspaper Test to 
Administrative Hearings 
Lower courts have commonly applied the Richmond Newspaper test to 
administrative hearings but have been divided in their outcomes.  In Tribune 
Co. v. D.M.L., the court never specifically articulated the two prong test, but 
appeared to rely on Chief Justice Burger’s historical analysis in finding a First 
Amendment right of access.137  However, after finding a First Amendment 
 
history of closed proceedings.)  In re Donovan, 801 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (no 
First Amendment right of access to grand jury materials in criminal investigation of labor 
secretary due to long tradition of grand jury secrecy and need for secrecy for proper functioning 
of grand juries). 
 132. Olsen, supra note 41, at 485. 
 133. United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983); Olson, supra note 41, at 485-
86. 
 134. See Cable News Network v. American Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1244,1245 (N.D. 
Ga. 1981).  Court found a First Amendment right of access to presidential press conferences in 
spite of the comparatively short history of access.  The court referred to the short history as an 
“enduring and vital tradition of public” access.). 
 135. Jurisprudence surrounding the First Amendment right of access to pretrial documents has 
been convoluted.  Compare Assoc. Press v. United States Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 
1983) (finding a First Amendment right of access to pretrial documents in general), with Chicago 
Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding the 
First Amendment right of access did not extend to discovery materials and was properly left to 
the discretion of the trial court. 
 136. See Chicago Tribune, 263 F.3d at 1310. 
 137. The court never applied the facts of their case to the two-prong test, but seemed to 
rationalize that administrative hearings were similar to civil and criminal court proceedings.  The 
standard the court articulated was, “civil and criminal court proceedings in Florida are public 
events, and we must adhere to the well established common law right of access to court 
proceedings and records.  Closure of such proceedings or records should only occur in limited 
circumstances, for example, when, as in this case, it is necessary to comply with established 
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right of access, the court reasoned that under strict scrutiny, the right of 
confidentiality of medical records outweighed the First Amendment right of 
access and the hearings were allowed to be closed.138  Other lower courts have 
refused to extend the First Amendment right of access to medical and judicial 
disciplinary proceedings.139  On the other hand, several lower courts have 
applied the Richmond Newspaper test and found a First Amendment right of 
access.140  In making its ruling in Society of Professional Journalists v. 
Secretary of Labor, a federal district court recognized that the hearings were of 
“relative recent origin” but held the hearing at issue was analogous to a civil 
trial.141 
In conclusion, lower courts are able to manipulate the history prong to 
either “limit or expand access, depending on whether the court examines the 
tradition of openness for the particular proceeding (as in Society of 
Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor), for similar proceedings (as in 
administrative fact-finding hearings), or for general types of proceedings (as 
with civil trials).”142 
II.  CASE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Sixth Circuit: Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft 
On December 19, 2001, Immigration Judge Elizabeth Hacker conducted a 
bond hearing for Rabih Haddad (“Haddad”), a case the government had 
 
public policy set forth by the legislature and to avoid substantial injury to [the defendants]” 
Tribune Co. v. D.M.L., 566 So.2d 1333, 1334 (FL. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
 138. Tribune Co., 566 So.2d at 1333-34 (“the party seeking closure of a hearing. . . has the 
burden at the trial level, and on appeal, to justify closure”). 
 139. See, e.g., Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino, 564 N.E.2d 1046 (N.Y. 1990) (dentist’s 
disciplinary proceeding did not meet either criterion of the Richmond Newspaper test); First 
Amendment Coalition, 784 F.2d at 467  (judicial misconduct hearing failed to show a need for 
public access). 
 140. See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Weisenberg, 455 N.Y.S.2d 413, aff’d, 59 N.Y.2d 378 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1982) (finding a First Amendment right of access to administrative unemployment benefits 
hearing); Soc’y of Prof’l Jounalists v. Sec. of Labor, 616 F.Supp. 569 (D. Utah 1985) (finding a 
First Amendment right of access to a fact-finding hearing by the federal Mine Safety and Health 
Administration). 
 141. Olson, supra note 41, at 487 (citing Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F.Supp. at 575).  
The Court found a First Amendment right of access to the administrative fact-finding hearings of 
the federal Mine, Safety and Health Administration.  In making the analogy to a civil trial the 
court concluded that “to the extent that there his a tradition of holding this type of hearing, there 
is a tradition that the hearings have been open to the public,” despite the fact that the Mine, Safety 
and Health Administration almost always closed it’s hearings to the public. 
 142. Id. 
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secretly designated as a “special interest” case.143  Haddad was subject to 
deportation for overstaying his tourist visa.144  His case was classified as 
“special interest” because “the government suspected the charity Haddad 
operated supplied funds to terrorist organizations.”145  Haddad’s family, 
members of the public, and several newspapers sought to attend his deportation 
hearing.146  Without prior notice to the public, Haddad, or his attorney, 
courtroom security officers announced that the hearing was closed to the public 
and the press.147  Haddad was denied bail, detained, and remained in 
government custody.148  Haddad and several newspapers filed complaints for 
injunctive and declaratory relief, asserting, among other things, First and Fifth 
Amendment violations.149  They named Attorney General Ashcroft, Chief 
Immigration Judge Creppy and Immigration Judge Hacker as defendants 
(collectively “the Government”).150  The newspapers, separately from Haddad, 
sought a declaratory judgment that the Creppy directive, facially and as 
applied, violated their First Amendment right of access to Haddad’s 
deportation proceedings.151 In their opinions, the district court, and 
subsequently the circuit court, only addressed the declaratory judgment motion 
by the newspapers.152 
The district court initially granted the Newspaper’s motion for declaratory 
judgment, finding that the Newspapers had a First Amendment right of access 
to the proceedings under Richmond Newspaper and its progeny.153  The 
government timely filed its notice of appeal and on April 10, 2002, obtained a 
temporary stay of the district court order from the Sixth Circuit.154  The Sixth 
Circuit’s opinion, upholding a First Amendment right of access for the 
newspapers, was issued August 26, 2002.155 
 
 143. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684. 
 144. Id. at 684 n.2 (“With the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Congress changed the nomenclature of exclusion and deportation 
proceedings.  Both are now refereed to as “removal” hearings.  See 8 U.S.C §1229(a).  However, 
the historical and legal distinctions still remain.  See Zadvdas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 
(2001)”). 
 145. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 684 n.4. 
 153. Id. at 684. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 681. 
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Third Circuit: North Jersey Media Group v. Aschroft 
From November 2001 to February 2002, reporters from the New Jersey 
Law Journal and Herald News (“Newspapers”) were repeatedly denied docket 
information and access to deportation proceedings in Newark’s Immigration 
Court.156  On March 6, 2002, Newspapers filed a federal district court 
challenge to the Creppy Directive, asserting that its mandated policy of closing 
every “special interest” case violated their First Amendment right of access to 
the deportation hearings.157  They argued not only that individualized inquiries 
are proper and practical, but also that because the Directive permits special 
interest detainees themselves to disseminate information concerning their 
proceedings, its “veil of secrecy is ineffective at best.”158  Although the Creppy 
Directive did not itself prohibit aliens and their counsel from themselves 
disclosing information about special interest hearings, a recently promulgated 
regulation authorizes immigration judges to issue protective orders and seal 
records as necessary to protect sensitive “law enforcement or national security 
information.”159  As this regulation took place on the day the District Court 
rendered its decision, it played no role in that opinion.160 
The District Court applied the two-part First Amendment analysis set forth 
in Richmond Newspapers and found that since the promulgation of the modern 
immigration regulations there has been a “presumption of openness for 
deportation proceedings,” or at a minimum, there has been “no tradition of 
their presumptive closure.161  The District Court accordingly granted 
Newspaper’s motion and temporarily enjoined the Creppy Directive’s 
operation.162  On June 17, 2002, the Third Circuit granted expedited review of 
the Governments appeal but denied a stay.163  A week later the Supreme Court 
granted a stay of the District Court’s injunction pending the final disposition of 
this appeal.164  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion on 
October 8, 2002.165 
III.  COURT’S ANALYSIS 
 
 156. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 203. 
 157. Id. at 203-04. 
 158. Id. at 204. 
 159. Id. n.2 (describing 67 Fed. Reg. 36799 (2002)). 
 160. Id. 
 161. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 204 (citing N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
205 F.Supp.2d 288, 300). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 198. 
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Sixth Circuit: Detroit Free Press v. Aschroft 
The United States District Court in Michigan, and later the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, were the first courts to determine if the Creppy Directive 
violated the First Amendment access rights to deportation hearings.166  
Initially, the district court held the Creppy Directive violated the First 
Amendment right of access.167  In reaching this outcome, the court concluded 
that the Richmond Newspaper test should apply to deportation hearings, and a 
First Amendment right of access existed.168  The district court also refused to 
determine if national security was a “compelling governmental interest” under 
the lesser “deference standard” and instead determined an analysis under 
“strict scrutiny” was necessary.169 
The district court’s ruling was upheld by a unanimous panel of the Sixth 
Circuit.170  Judge Damon Keith, writing for the court, also determined that the 
Richmond Newspapers test was applicable to deportation hearings and 
concluded that the public had a First Amendment right of access to the 
hearings.171 
The first issue of law Judge Keith and the Sixth Circuit addressed was the 
correct standard of review to apply in this case.172  The government contended 
that because it has plenary authority over immigration, its power supercedes 
any First Amendment right of access, and even if the First Amendment is 
applicable to deportation hearings, the court should review its actions using 
“deferential review” as opposed to the normal strict scrutiny test.173  Under 
deferential review, the governmental policy infringing upon the First 
Amendment access right would be upheld if “facially legitimate and bona 
fide.”174  The court refused to accept the government’s arguments and instead 
held that the “Constitution meaningfully limits non-substantive immigration 
laws and does not require special deference to the Government.”175  In 
reaching its holding, the court recognized a distinction between substantive 
 
 166. Compare Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 681 (decided August 26, 2002) with N. Jersey 
Media Group, 308 F.3d at 198 (decided October 8, 2002). 
 167. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684. 
 168. Detroit Free Press, 195 F.Supp.2d at 947. 
 169. Id. at 945. 
 170. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683. 
 171. Id. at 705. 
 172. Id. at 685. 
 173. Id. at 686 n.7.  Instead of applying the normal strict scrutiny test, the government argues 
that their plenary power over immigration matters entitles them to more deference.  See, e.g., 
Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 753 (no First Amendment bar to excluding people because of their 
beliefs); Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 237 (courts cannot limit Congress from expelling “aliens whose 
race or habit render them undesirable as citizens”). 
 174. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d. at 686; see Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 770. 
 175. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d. at 684. 
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immigration laws, which the courts must give special deference, and non-
substantive immigration laws, which are reviewed under strict scrutiny.176  The 
court supported and justified this distinction with several arguments.  The court 
first determined that the watershed case on immigration, The Chinese 
Exclusion Case, and all subsequent cases, gave deference to the federal 
government only in substantive immigration issues.177  The court further 
explained that if it were to adopt the deferential standard for non-substantive 
issues, the Constitution would be unable to limit the powers over immigration 
matters and would allow the government to “transform the First Amendment 
from the great instrument of open democracy to a safe harbor from public 
scrutiny.”178 
The second issue the court addressed was determining if the First 
Amendment should apply to non-citizens.179  The court began its analysis on 
this issue by examining other types of constitutional issues the Supreme Court 
and other circuits have deemed apply to deportation hearings and non-
citizens.180  In the areas of due process and the Fifth Amendment the Supreme 
Court has held that non-citizens seeking entry into the United States have no 
Constitutional rights because they have little or no ties with the United 
States.181  But, non-citizens living within the United States have sufficient ties, 
 
 176. Id. at 686 (“The difference between a substantive and non-substantive immigration is 
that substantive immigration laws answer the questions, ‘who is allowed entry’ or ‘who can be 
deported’”). 
 177. Id. at 685-86.  See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604, 606: “If the government . . . 
considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country . . . to be dangerous to its 
peace and security, . . . this determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.”  The court however, 
acknowledges that Congress’s power over immigration matters was limited by “the constitution 
itself”; Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (in a deportation hearing, the Court concluded “the power to expel 
or exclude aliens is a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the government’s political 
department’s largely immune from judicial control”).  See also Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 
687 (distinguishing Kleindienst by two ways: (1) Kleindienst involved a substantive immigration 
decision; (2) Kleindienst refused to balance the First Amendment right against the government’s 
plenary power, because the law was a substantive immigration law). 
 178. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d. at 686.  The court also notes that the “dominant purpose of 
the First Amendment is to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of 
embarrassing information.” Justice Murphy also noted that to allow the government to transform 
the First Amendment to a “safe harbor from public scrutiny . . . would make our constitutional 
safeguards transitory and discriminatory in nature . . . we cannot agree that the framers of the 
Constitution meant to make such an empty mockery of human freedom” (citations omitted). 
 179. Id. at 687-88. 
 180. See id. 688-89. 
 181. Id.  (citing Hellenic Lines Ltd. V. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 309 (1970)) (stating that “once 
an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution to all people within our borders”).  See also Ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (an 
alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on different footing with regard to due process); 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (can exclude the wife of a United States citizen 
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and therefore have the same Constitutional rights and protections as citizens.182  
The court further extrapolated this to conclude that non-citizen deportees 
would get the full protection of the First Amendment because, like the Fifth 
Amendment, the First Amendment applies to “people” and not just to citizens, 
and the deportee has sufficient ties to count as a “person” under the 
Constitution.183 
Judge Keith then addressed the issue of “whether the First Amendment 
affords the public a right of access to deportation hearings.”184  The 
government “contended that Richmond Newspapers and its progeny are limited 
to judicial proceedings” and therefore the court should apply the “more 
deferential standard articulated in Houchins v. KQED.”185  Yet, the court held 
that the appropriate standard for determining if a First Amendment right of 
access exists in administrative deportation hearings is set out in Richmond 
Newspapers.186  In support of its holding, the court determined that the facts in 
Houchins were distinguishable from the facts in Detroit Free Press.187 Also, 
Richmond Newspaper was decided chronologically after Houchins, so it is 
controlling precedent.188  Additionally, the court noted that other courts, as 
well as the Sixth Circuit, have expanded the Richmond Newspaper test outside 
the criminal judicial context, and therefore, it ultimately concluded that the 
 
without a hearing or reason); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920) (trying to deport a 
person claiming citizenship based on evidence produced in absentia and not recorded or released 
to the deportee violates his Fifth Amendment right); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) 
(court stated that “once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that 
go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly”). 
 182. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 689. 
 183. Detroit Fee Press, 303 F.3d at 690-91. 
 184. Id. at 694. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Compare id. at 694, (Newspaper Plaintiffs request that they be able to attend the 
hearings on equal footing with the public.  Court is interpreting the speech clause of the First 
Amendment) with Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 3 (1978) (issue decided was “whether the 
news media have a constitutional right of access to a county jail, over and above that of other 
persons, to interview inmates and make sound recordings, films and photographs for publication.”  
The court was deciding the issue based upon the press clause of the First Amendment). 
 188. “The Richmond Newspaper’s two part test sufficiently addresses all the Houchins 
court’s concerns for the implications of a constitutionally mandated general right of access to 
government information.” Also, by the Supreme Court “repeatedly applying the Richmond 
Newspapers test to assess the merits of case claiming First Amendment access rights to different 
government proceedings, it is clear that the Court has since moved away from its position in 
Houchins.”  Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 694-95. 
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Richmond Newspaper test should apply to administrative deportation 
hearings.189 
The court then applied the Richmond Newspaper test.  In evaluating the 
experience prong, the court held that “deportation proceedings historically 
have been open . . . [a]lthough exceptions may have been allowed, the general 
policy has been one of openness.”190  In its analysis, the Sixth Circuit adopted 
Brennan approach and determined that “although historical context is 
important, a brief historical tradition might be sufficient to establish a First 
Amendment right of access where the beneficial effects of access to that 
process are overwhelming and uncontradicted.”191  In justifying its holding, the 
court partially relied on the Immigration and Naturalization Act and 
subsequent INS regulations.  The court determined that since the Act was 
enacted in 1882, Congress had passed numerous statutes closing exclusion 
hearings, but none of these statutes ever required deportation hearings to be 
closed.192  In fact, “since 1965 INS regulations have explicitly required 
deportation proceedings to be presumptively open,” and Congress has yet to 
correct them by amending the Act.193 
In addressing the logic prong of Richmond Newspapers, the court held that 
public access “undoubtedly enhances the quality of deportation hearings.”194  
In reaching this conclusion, the court rearticulated much of the same reasoning 
as is found in Richmond Newspapers.  The five reasons given by the court 
were: (1) “public access acts as a check on the actions of the Executive by 
ensuring . . . proceedings are conducted fairly and properly;”195 (2) “openness 
 
 189. Id. at 695 (citing United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 824 (6th Cir. 2002) test 
applied to university student disciplinary board proceedings); Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 710 
F.2d at 1177-79  (Sixth Circuit applied the test to a civil action against administrative agency); 
Publicker Indus, 733 F.2d at 1059 (Third Circuit applied test to a civil trial); Whiteland Woods, 
193 F.3d at 181 (Third Circuit applied test to a municipal planning meeting); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. 
United States Dept. of Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (test applied to agriculture 
department’s voters list); Soc’y of Prof’l. Journalists, 616 F.Supp. at 574 (test applied to 
administrative hearing). 
 190. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d. at 701. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. An exclusion hearing is a hearing to prevent someone from entering the country, 
while a deportation hearing is to remove someone from the country. 
 193. Id. Since 1965, Congress has amended the Immigration and Nationality Act at least 53 
times. 
 194. Id. at 703.  The standard for the logic prong being articulated is “whether public access 
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” 
 195. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 703-04.  The court reasoned that “[i]n an area such as 
immigration, where the government has nearly unlimited authority; the press and the public serve 
as perhaps the only check on abusive government practices. 
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ensures the government does its job properly [and] doesn’t make mistakes;”196 
(3) deportation hearings serve a “therapeutic purpose as outlets for community 
concern, hostility, and emotions” after the devastation of September 
eleventh;197 (4) “openness enhances the perception of integrity and fairness;”198 
and (5) “public access helps ensure that individual citizens can effectively 
participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government.”199 
Having found that both prongs of Richmond Newspapers were satisfied 
and a First Amendment right of access existed, the Sixth Circuit analyzed 
whether the government had made a sufficient showing of a compelling 
interest to overcome that right under strict scrutiny.200  The court, disagreeing 
with the district court, held that national security was a “compelling interest 
sufficient to justify closure.”201  The court gave great deference to the 
declarations of the F.B.I. agents in determining that the government had a 
compelling interest because the “agents are certainly in a better position to 
understand the contours of the investigation and intelligence capabilities of 
terrorist organizations.”202 However, the court held that the Creppy Directive 
failed under strict scrutiny because it was not “narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest,” and the immigration judge did not articulate “findings specific 
enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was 
properly entered.”203 
 
 196. Id. at 704 (citing Kwock Jan Fat, 253 U.S. at 464 (“It is better that many [immigrants] 
should be improperly admitted than one natural born citizen of the United States should be 
permanently excluded from his country”); Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F.Supp. at 575-76 
(“Congressional oversight hearings can prevent future mistakes, but they can do little to correct 
past ones.  In contrast, openness at the hearings can allow mistakes to be cured at once.  
[Moreover,] the natural tendency of government officials is to hold their meetings in secret.  They 
can thereby avoid criticism and proceed informally and less carefully.”). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 704:  “The most stringent safeguards for a deportee 
would be of limited worth if the public is not persuaded that the standards are being fairly 
enforced.  Legitimacy rests in large part on public understanding.”  See First Amendment 
Coalition, 784 F.2d at 486 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 199. Id. at 704-05 (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604).  The court’s reasoning is 
public access “helps inform the public on affairs of the government [and this] direct knowledge 
. . . enhances [their] ability to affirm or protest government’s effort.”  Id. at 705. 
 200. Id. at 705. 
 201. Id. The compelling governmental interest is “the protection of national security by 
safeguarding the government’s investigation of the September eleventh terrorist attack and other 
terrorist conspiracies.” 
 202. Id. at 707 (citing CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 180 (“it is the responsibility of the Director 
of Central Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the variety of complex and subtle 
factors in determining . . . the Agencies intelligence gathering process.”)). 
 203. Detroit Free Press, 202 F.3d at 707.  See Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 606-07 
(“[D]enial [of a First Amendment access right] is necessitated by a compelling governmental 
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The Creppy Directive and the decision to close the deportation hearing 
failed the strict scrutiny analysis both on its face and as applied.  Immigration 
Judge Hacker “failed to make specific findings before closing . . . [the] 
deportation proceedings,” and the Creppy Directive failed to give this 
instruction to the immigration judges.204  A second reason the Creppy 
Directive failed the strict scrutiny analysis was because it was not “narrowly 
tailored.”205 
In deciding the “narrow tailoring” requirement of strict scrutiny the court 
agreed with the newspaper’s argument that the “Creppy Directive is ineffective 
in achieving its goal because the detainees and their lawyers are allowed to 
publicize the proceedings.”206  Furthermore, the court determined there are less 
restrictive alternatives to serve the governments purpose than the Creppy 
Directive.207  Therefore, the court concluded the same information could be 
kept from the public on a “case-by-case basis through protective orders or in 
camera reviews.”208  The government also argued that “open hearings would 
reveal the amount of intelligence that the government does not possess.”209  
The court rejected this argument because in deportation hearings the issue is 
narrowly focused, the government has control over the evidence it introduces, 
and the standards for deportation are very low.210  The court also held that the 
case-by-case analysis required under strict scrutiny cannot be done in secret by 
the government and must be done in a manner that will lend itself to review.211 
In summary, the Sixth Circuit held the Creppy Directive failed strict 
scrutiny because it is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive.212  It was 
 
interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest”); Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10 (“The 
interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough tat a reviewing court can 
determine whether the closure order was properly entered.”) 
 204. Id.  See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13 (instructs that in cases where partial or 
complete closure is warranted, there must be specific findings on the record so that a reviewing 
court can determine whether closure was proper and a less restrictive alternative exists). 
 205. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 707. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 708. 
 208. Id. The government contends that there is sensitive information that would be disclosed 
if closure occurred on a case-by-case basis such as the name of the defendant and by the mere 
closure of the hearing the terrorists would be alerted that the government is aware of a person’s 
involvement.  The court rejects this argument because “the information is already being disclosed 
to the public through the detainees themselves or their counsel.” 
 209. Id. at 709. 
 210. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 709:  “To deport, the immigration judge must be 
convinced by clear and convincing evidence that the alien was admitted as a non-immigrant for a 
specific period, that the period has elapsed, and that the alien is still in this country, see Shahla v. 
INS, 749 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1984)”. 
 211. Id. at 710. 
 212. Id. 
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“under-inclusive by permitting the disclosure of sensitive information, while at 
the same time drastically restricting First Amendment access rights” and over-
inclusive by “categorically and completely closing all special interest hearings 
without demonstrating, beyond speculation, that such a closure is absolutely 
necessary.”213 
Third Circuit: North Jersey Media Group v. Aschcroft 
Initially, the United States District Court in North Jersey, like the Sixth 
Circuit, held the Creppy Directive violated the First Amendment right of 
access to deportation hearings.214  In reaching this outcome, the district court 
concluded that deportation hearings fulfill both prongs of the Richmond 
Newspapers analysis.215  The district court reasoned that deportation hearings 
have a First Amendment right of access because of the “presumption of 
openness for deportation proceedings”216 and the “undeniable similarities” 
between deportation hearings and judicial hearings, which “lead[s] to the 
conclusion that the same functional goals served by openness in the civil and 
criminal judicial contexts would be equally served in the context of deportation 
hearings.”217 
The trial court’s ruling was ultimately reversed by a divided panel of the 
Third Circuit.218  Chief Judge Becker wrote for the majority and applied the 
Richmond Newspapers test, yet concluded that there was no First Amendment 
right of access.219  Judge Scirica, in his dissent, agreed that the Richmond 
Newspapers test was applicable to administrative hearings but concluded there 
was a First Amendment right of access.220 
The first issue of law Chief Judge Becker and the Third Circuit addressed 
was the applicability of the Richmond Newspapers test to administrative 
deportation proceedings.  The government contended that the Richmond 
Newspapers test, “developed as it was for criminal trials, [had] no proper 
 
 213. Id. 
 214. N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 301-02. 
 215. Id. at 300 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 301; Recent Case: First Amendment—Public Accesss to Deportation Hearings—
Third Circuit Holds that the Governmetn Can Close “Sepcial Interest” Deprotation Hearings—
North Jersey Media Group, Inc, v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1193, 1193 (2003) [herinafter Harvard Article.] 
 218. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 204-05; Harvard Article, supra note 217, at 1193. 
 219. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 199, 201.  Chief Judge Becker was joined in the 
majority opinion by Judge Greenberg.  Becker is probably best known to law students as the chief 
architect of the new procedure adopted by the Third Circuit and many other circuits for delaying 
hiring of law clerks until the second year of law school. 
 220. Id. at 221. 
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application outside the judicial realm.”221  The government’s argument rested 
on the notion that Article III of the Constitution is silent on the question of 
public access to judicial trials.222  Conversely, Articles I and II do “address the 
question of access, and they do not provide for Executive or Legislative 
proceedings to be open to the public.”223  Therefore, the government’s 
argument concluded that Richmond Newspapers should not apply “where the 
Constitution’s structure dictates that no First Amendment right applies and 
should be left to the political branches to determine the proper degree of access 
to administrative proceedings.”224  The Third Circuit rejected this argument 
and agreed with the district court and other circuits, in holding that the 
Richmond Newspapers test is applicable in administrative setting such as 
deportation hearings.225 
Chief Judge Becker then addressed the issue of whether, under the 
Richmond Newspapers test, the public has a First Amendment right of 
access.226  The court first evaluated the experience prong and held that “the 
tradition of open deportation hearings is too recent and inconsistent to support 
a First Amendment right of access.”227  The court began its analysis by 
determining that the question of whether a proceeding has been “historically 
 
 221. Id. at 204.  The government is basing its argument for not expanding the scope of the 
First Amendment beyond criminal cases partly because Justice O’Connor specifically stated that 
the Court’s holdings in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper do not “carry any 
implications outside the context of criminal trials.”  Globe, 457 U.S. at 611 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 222. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 207. 
 223. Id.  Footnote 4 declares that the only constitutionalized access requirement vis-à-vis the 
Executive is that the President “from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of 
the Union.” U.S. CONST. art. II, §3.  The Constitution also requires Congress to publish a “regular 
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all Public Money,” U.S. CONST. art. 
I, §9, cl. 7, and instructs each House of Congress to publish a journal of proceedings from which 
it may withhold “such parts as it may in its judgment require secrecy.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §5, cl. 
3. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 207-09.  In rejecting this argument the court relies heavily on its precedent in 
Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1059, in which the court applied the Richmond Newspapers test to civil 
trials and found a First Amendment right of access.  See also First Amendment Coalition, 784 
F.2d at 467 (the Third Circuit applied the Richmond Newspaper test to administrative hearings 
but concluded “these administrative proceedings, unlike conventional criminal and civil trials, do 
not have a long history of openness.”); Whiteland Woods, 193 F.3d at 177 (applied the Richmond 
Newspaper test and determined a man did not have the right to videotape a township planning 
commission meeting). 
 226. Id. at 204-05.  The Third Circuit disagreed with the district court’s analysis and 
application of the Richmond Newspapers test.  Not the application of the test to administrative 
deportation hearings. 
 227. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 211. 
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open” is only an objective inquiry.228  The court acknowledged that since 
deportation procedures were implemented, the “governing statutes have always 
expressly closed exclusion hearings but have never closed deportation 
hearings.”229 
Newspapers argued that the Justice Department’s regulations created a 
presumption of openness by stating, “all hearings, other than exclusion 
hearings, shall be open to the public except that . . . for purposes of protecting 
. . . the public interest, the Immigration Judge may limit attendance or hold a 
closed hearing.”230  Despite this argument, Judge Becker observed that, in 
practice, deportation hearings have been frequently closed to the public or held 
in locations inaccessible to the public whereas, criminal trials have been open 
to the public since the Norman Conquest and access to civil trials is “beyond 
dispute.”231  The court also observed that the government has a tradition of 
closing sensitive proceedings before administrative agencies.232  The court 
ultimately concluded that according to both Supreme Court and Third Circuit 
precedent, in order to satisfy the experience prong, the history of openness 
must be beyond dispute.233 Justice Becker was also hesitant to find that 
deportation hearings should fulfill the experience prong because of the 
“perverse consequences” that may result.234  He concluded that the court must 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 212 (citing 8 C.F.R § 3.27). 
 231. Id. at 212-13 (deportation hearings involving children are closed to the public.  
Deportation hearings are also sometimes held in prisons, hospitals, or private homes which are 
inaccessible to the general public); Harvard Article, supra note 217, at 1195. 
 232. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 210 (citing 20 C.F.R § 404.944, which closes Social 
Security hearings to “the parties and to other persons the administrative law judge considers 
necessary and proper.”)  Likewise, disbarment hearings are presumptively closed.  12 C.F.R § 
19.199 (Office of Comptroller of Currency); 12 CFR § 263.97 (Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors) are proceedings which are all presumptively or mandatory closed the public.  
Additionally, several hearings are closed at the administrator’s discretion for good cause to 
protect the public interest or other similar standards.  See, e.g. 5 CFR § 185.132(d) (Office of 
Personnel Management); 10 CFR § 13.30(d) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 13 CFR § 
142.21(d) (Small Business Administration); 28 CFR §68.39(a) (Department of Justice); 31 CFR § 
500.713(a) (Office of Foreign Asset Control); 38 CFR § 42.30(d) (Office of Veteran’s Affairs).  
See also 5 CFR § 2638.505(e)(2) (hearings on ethics charges against government employees may 
be closed “in the best interests of national security, the respondent employee, a witness, the public 
or other affected persons”); 10 CFR § 1003.62(a) (hearings before department of Energy House 
of Hearings and Appeals may be closed at the discretion of the administrator). 
 233. Id. at 212-13:  “the court noted an “unbroken, uncontradicted history” of public access to 
criminal trials in Anglo American law running from before the Norman Conquest to the present, 
and it emphasized that it had not found a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in 
any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this country.  Likewise in Publicker, 
733 F.2d at 1059, we found that access to civil trials at common law was beyond dispute.” 
 234. Id. at 215 
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adopt a “rigorous experience test” because it was “necessary to preserve the 
basic tenet of administrative law, that agencies should be free to fashion their 
own rules and procedure.”235 
In reaching this holding, the most difficult case for the Third Circuit to 
interpret was the recent Supreme Court decision in FMC v. South Carolina 
Ports Authority.236  In that case, the Supreme Court held state sovereign 
immunity applies to administrative proceedings because even though 
formalized administrative adjudications were unheard of in the framers’ time, 
administrative adjudications “walk, talk, and squawk [were] very much like a 
[civil] lawsuit.”237  The Sixth Circuit distinguished North Jersey Media from 
South Carolina State Ports Authority by holding that “while sovereign 
immunity is akin to a fundamental right, there is no fundamental right to attend 
governmental proceedings, and the court thus declined to loosen the Ports 
Authority analysis from its Eleventh Amendment moorings.”238 
For these reasons, the court ultimately held “the tradition of open 
deportation hearings is simply not comparable” to the tradition of access to 
criminal and civil trials.239  The court also recognized that in its precedent it 
does not require a showing of openness at common law.240  However, this 
precedent does not require the court to dispense with the Richmond 
Newspapers “experience requirement where history is ambiguous or lacking, 
and to recognize a First Amendment right based solely on the logic enquiry.” 
241  Furthermore, the court opined that it would “not recognize a First 
Amendment right based solely on the logic prong if there is history of closure” 
because it would compel “the executive to close its proceeding to the public ab 
initio or risk creating a constitutional right of access that would preclude [the 
government] from closing [administrative proceedings] in the future.”242 
 
 235. Id. at 216 (internal quotations removed) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 544 (1978)). 
 236. See id. at 214-15. 
 237. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 215 (citing  Fed. Maritime Comm’n v. S.C. State 
Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1872 (2002)); Harvard Article, supra note 217, at 1200 n. 23. 
 238. Harvard Article, supra note 217, at 1200 n.23 (internal citations removed).  See also N. 
Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 216. 
 239. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 213.  See also Harvard Article, supra note 217, at 
1195. 
 240. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 213 (citing Criden, 675 F.2d at 555 (Third Circuit 
finding a right of access to pretrial hearings even though no right existed at common law); United 
States v. Simone 14 F.3d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding a right although no history predated 
1980); Whiteland Woods, 193 F.3d at 181 (finding a tradition of accessibility based on a recent 
statutory guarantee)). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 216. The court failed to completely adopt the government’s argument that by 
recognizing a First Amendment right of access it would permanently consitutionalize a right of 
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In evaluating the logic prong of the Richmond Newspapers test, Judge 
Becker began by agreeing with the district court that “the same functional 
goals served by openness in the civil and criminal judicial contexts would be 
equally served in the context of deportation hearings.”243  Yet, he faulted the 
district court and other courts for not taking into account the flip-side of this 
analysis, and he appeared to create a balancing test in the logic prong analysis 
by noting that “any inquiry into whether a role is positive must . . . consider 
whether it is potentially harmful.”244  Otherwise, he reasoned the logic inquiry 
is irrelevant in the Richmond Newspapers analysis, and it would be difficult to 
“conceive of a government proceeding to which the public would not have a 
First Amendment right of access.”245 
In considering this flip-side, the court found that “the government 
presented substantial evidence that open deportation hearings would threaten 
national security.”246  Judge Becker based this conclusion on the speculative 
declaration of F.B.I. official Dale Watson, “which set forth several potential 
national security dangers” created by these “special interest” deportation 
hearings.247  However, the court justified the speculative declaration by giving 
 
access whenever an executive agency does not consistently bar all public access to a particular 
proceeding. 
 243.  
The Third Circuit has noted in subsequent cases six values typically served by openness: 
(1) Promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by providing the public 
with the more complete understanding of the judicial system; (2) promotion of the public 
perception of fairness which can be achieved only by permitting full public view of the 
proceedings; (3) providing a significant community therapeutic value as an outlet for 
community concern, hostility and emotion; (4) serving as a check on corrupt practices by 
exposing the judicial process to public scrutiny; (5) enhancement of the performance of 
all involved; and (6) discouragement of perjury.  
(quoting Simone, 14 F.3d at 839). 
 244. Id. at 200-01, 217 
 245. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 217.  The court additionally notes that they were 
unable to locate any proceeding which passed the experience test through its history of openness, 
yet failed the logic test by not serving community values.  Additionally, the court also observed 
that the Supreme Court obviously didn’t mean to conclude that the logic test shouldn’t take into 
account the positive and the negative because otherwise public access to any governmental affair, 
even internal CIA deliberations, would promote informed discussion among the citizenry and 
therefore be open. 
 246. Id.; Harvard Article, supra note 217, at 1195. 
 247. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d  at 218-19; Harvard Article, supra note 217 at 1195.  
The specific six dangers to national security presented in the Watson declaration are: (1) public 
hearings would necessarily reveal sources and methods of investigation; (2) the information given 
on how the individual entered the country would allow terrorist organizations to see patters of 
entry that worked and didn’t; (3) information will reveal to terrorists which cells have been 
discovered by the government and which cells are still clandestine; (4) if a terrorist organization 
discovers a particular member is detained, or that information about a plot is known, it may 
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great deference to Dale Watson because it was “hesitant to conduct a judicial 
inquiry into the credibility of these security concerns, as national security is an 
area where courts have traditionally extended great deference to Executive 
expertise.”248  The court found that the district court had considered these 
national security dangers but had incorrectly considered them only under their 
strict scrutiny analysis after finding a First Amendment right of access 
existed.249  Instead, the Sixth Circuit concluded these considerations must be 
taken into account in the logic prong analysis.250  The court also used this 
evidence of a national security threat to find support for the government’s 
request to reject a case-by-case closure determination because even “bits and 
pieces of information that may appear innocuous in isolation can be fit into a 
bigger picture by terrorist groups . . . [and] given judges relative lack of 
expertise regarding national security and their inability to see the mosaic, we 
should not entrust to them the decision whether an isolated fact is sensitive 
enough to warrant closure.”251  For these reasons, the court concluded the logic 
prong of the Richmond Newspapers test, like the experience prong, was not 
satisfied. 
In conclusion, the court held that “open deportation hearings do not pass 
the two-part Richmond Newspapers test, [and as a result] the press and public 
possess no First Amendment right of access.”252  Therefore, the court reasoned, 
it was unnecessary to determine if the Creppy Directive would “pass a strict 
 
accelerate the timing of the planned attack and not give the government enough time to stop it; (5) 
a public hearing would allow terrorist organizations to interfere with the pending proceedings by 
creating false or misleading evidence; (6) INS detainees have a privacy interest in having their 
possible connection to an ongoing investigation kept undisclosed because even if they later found 
not to be linked to a terrorist organization, the public may still consider them a terrorist; (7) 
proceedings can’t be closed on a case by case basis because the judges lack knowledge on what is 
secret and what is not. 
 248. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 219. 
 249. Id. at 217. 
 250. Id.  “Although the district court discussed these concerns as part of its strict scrutiny 
analysis, they are equally applicable to the question [of] whether openness, on balance serves a 
positive role in removal hearings.”  The court recognized “there is an evidentiary overlap between 
the Richmond Newspaper logic prong and the subsequent compelling government interest strict 
scrutiny investigation necessary upon finding a First Amendment right of access.  Nonetheless, 
the court concludes the inquiries are not redundant because it is possible for openness to serve a 
positive role under a balanced logic prong even though the government has a compelling interest 
in closure.  This would simply require that the policy rationales supporting openness be even 
more compelling than those supporting closure.”  Id. at 217 n.13. 
 251. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 219 (quoting Declaration of Dale L. Watson at 8-9); 
Harvard Article, Supra note 217 at 1195). 
 252. Id. at 221. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] PLEASE TAKE BACK YOUR HUDDLED MASSES 627 
 
scrutiny analysis and whether the district court’s “national in scope” injunction 
was too broad.”253 
IV.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
The overriding issue in both cases is: did the closure of administrative 
immigration cases to the public violate the First Amendment?  In this circuit 
split created between the Sixth and Third Circuits, the Sixth Circuit in Detroit 
Free Press v. Ashcroft correctly applied the Richmond Newspapers test in 
upholding the newspapers’ right of access to the hearings.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court correctly held there was a First Amendment right of 
access that was overshadowed by the compelling interest of national security.  
The court then correctly determined the Creppy Directive was unconstitutional 
because under strict scrutiny it did not narrowly serve the government’s 
interest.  While everyone may not agree with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis and 
outcome, the Sixth Circuit has correctly applied and analyzed the problem 
under Richmond Newspapers test that was articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court.  On the other hand, the Third Circuit in North Jersey Media v. 
Ashcroft wrongly interpreted the Supreme Court’s precedent and misapplied 
the test in determining there was no First Amendment right of access. 
There are several preliminary issues that both the Third Circuit and the 
Sixth Circuit addressed before applying the actual Richmond Newspapers test.  
The first significant issue both circuits addressed was whether the Supreme 
Court’s Richmond Newspapers doctrine should be applied to administrative 
proceedings, such as deportation hearings, to determine if the public had a First 
Amendment right of access.  Both circuits reached the same conclusion, that 
the Richmond Newspapers analysis should be applied in administrative 
deportation hearings.  In reaching this conclusion, the government’s main 
concern was that by granting a public right of access to administrative 
proceedings, the floodgates would be open and the public would have access to 
all administrative hearings.  However, this very issue was addressed by Justice 
Brennan and is protected against in the Richmond Newspapers analysis.  His 
solution, and the Supreme Court’s solution, was to allow closure of 
proceedings that fulfilled both prongs of the Richmond Newspapers test, if the 
compelling reason survived strict scrutiny.  Additionally, the very structure of 
the Richmond Newspapers two pronged analysis is a prophylactic device 
against this concern.  Within the two prongs of the test, if the governmental 
proceeding has a history of openness and the public right of access in this 
particular occasion would benefit the proceedings, then a First Amendment 
right of access exists.  These two prongs of the test naturally limit public 
access to most “secret” governmental, administrative proceedings and 
 
 253. Id. 
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therefore the government’s concerns are unjustified.  Additionally, even if the 
two prong test would conclude the public has an access right to a sensitive 
administrative hearing, the government would still be able to show that the 
public should be excluded under strict scrutiny.  This would require the 
government to show that in this particular instance, access to this proceeding 
would jeopardize a compelling state interest and the method the government 
used to close the proceeding was the least restrictive.  For these reasons, both 
circuits correctly determined that the Richmond Newspapers analysis should be 
expanded to administrative deportation proceedings in order to determine if the 
public has a First Amendment right of access. 
In expanding the application of the Richmond Newspapers test to 
administrative deportation hearings, the courts should have further expanded 
its scope.  It would make sense not to limit the use of the Richmond 
Newspapers analysis to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings but rather to 
make it the uniform test to determine if the public has a right of access to any 
governmental meeting or activity.  The two prongs of the test can be applied 
either under Justice Brennan’s functional approach or Justice Burger’s 
historical approach to effectively limit most public access to governmental 
proceedings where no real benefit of openness would exist, and where there 
traditionally has been little or no access.  Additionally, the government is 
allowed to present a compelling governmental interest to close those 
proceedings.  Depending on the type of government proceeding, the court 
could evaluate this government interest under strict scrutiny or a standard that 
is more deferential to the government’s decision to close the proceedings.  This 
uniform analysis in determining if a First Amendment right of access existed 
for the public would alleviate much of the confusion in this area of law.  It 
would allow lower courts to reach more consistent results while at the same 
time allowing the government to restrict public access to confidential 
proceedings. 
The major issue, and what ultimately creates a circuit split, is the 
interpretation and application of the Richmond Newspapers test by the Third 
and Sixth Circuits.  The problem is partially in the misinterpretation of the 
Supreme Court precedent by the Third Circuit and partially a result of the 
ambiguity in the case law as to which prong of the two-prong analysis is most 
important.  There are two primary approaches in deciding which prong of the 
two-pronged analysis is most important: Justice Brennan’s and Justice 
Burger’s.  If a court were to adopt Justice Brennan’s logic, as the Third Circuit 
did, it would be more likely to determine there is a First Amendment right of 
access to proceedings, which recently came into existence, because less weight 
is placed on the history of the openness and more weight is placed on the 
benefits that public access will bring to the procedure.  However, if a 
procedure has a long history of openness but this openness provides very little 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] PLEASE TAKE BACK YOUR HUDDLED MASSES 629 
 
benefit to the proceedings, Justice Brennan’s approach may find there is no 
First Amendment right of access.  Conversely, if a court were to adopt Justice 
Burger’s approach to the Richmond Newspapers analysis, it would focus 
greater attention on the history of openness that has been enjoyed by the 
particular process as opposed to the benefits the proceeding derived from this 
openness.  Most courts seem to interpret Justice Burger’s approach as being 
one that requires a long history of openness.  But, it appears that events like 
deportation hearings, with a relatively short history of openness, would satisfy 
Burger’s approach if their history of openness extended as long as they were in 
existence.  In today’s ever-changing world with new regulations and 
governmental proceedings being carried out, it makes more sense to apply 
Justice Brennan’s approach and evaluate the history of openness, but place the 
majority of the emphasis of the test on the benefits the proceeding derives from 
public access.  Even though this approach has the potential of providing greater 
public access to proceedings, it can still be restricted by a compelling 
governmental interest under strict scrutiny.  Therefore, this approach appears 
to be the best alternative to recognize the importance of public access to 
recently created proceedings. 
The other reason the circuit split was created was the Third Circuit’s 
misapplication and misinterpretation of the Richmond Newspapers test.  In 
evaluating the history of deportation hearings under the experience prong, the 
Third Circuit concluded deportation hearings do not have a long enough 
history of openness.  The reason articulated for reaching this conclusion was 
that the history of openness for deportation hearings is much shorter than the 
history of openness for criminal trials.  However, the court failed to take into 
account the fact that deportation hearings have existed for a much shorter time 
than criminal trials and throughout their history deportation hearings have 
always been presumptively open.  A contributing factor to the Third Circuit’s 
false conclusion is the fact the court is unable to rely on judicial precedent to 
establish a history of openness because deportation hearings are an 
administrative function with little judicial oversight, and are rarely challenged 
in court system.  As a result, it may appear as if deportation hearings do not 
have a history of openness, when in fact they do.  Therefore, the Third Circuit 
incorrectly concluded that deportation hearings do not have a history of 
openness sufficient to satisfy the experience prong.  Additional evidence in 
support of this conclusion is the fact that the Attorney General has issued a 
regulation mandating “all hearings, other than exclusion hearings, shall be 
open to the public.” 
In their findings that the government may close deportation hearings, the 
Third Circuit, also misinterpreted the logic prong of the Richmond Newspapers 
test as it was laid out by the United States Supreme Court.  The Third Circuit 
appeared to create a balancing test that considered both the positive and 
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negative aspects of opening deportation hearings to the public.  This judicial 
innovation by the Third Circuit was wrong for two reasons.  First, there was no 
precedent for creating this innovation in the Supreme Court’s analysis.  
Secondly, it goes against the policy rationale of the First Amendment.  The 
First Amendment was drafted to allow public access to governmental 
proceedings because public access is required for our republic to survive.  The 
cornerstone requirement of a democratic nation is an informed public which is 
stifled if the government is allowed to act in secret, away from the scrutiny of 
the public.  As a result, it is imperative that any test constructed to determine if 
the First Amendment right of access err on the side of allowing too much 
public access.  In other words, it should be relatively easy to qualify for First 
Amendment protection. Therefore, the Richmond Newspapers test was 
constructed so that most proceedings are considered protected under the First 
Amendment right of access if they have, in the least bit shown to have been 
open to the public or can benefit by public access.  If, in analyzing the 
functional prong of the Richmond Newspapers test, the courts were to analyze 
the negative as well as the positive aspects of opening, the test would greatly 
restrict when there is a presumption of openness under the First Amendment.  
Additionally, the Supreme Court, in articulating the Richmond Newspapers test 
provided a mechanism to consider any negative aspects of opening the 
proceeding to the public.  The Court determined that the correct time and place 
to analyze the drawbacks of opening a procedure to the public was after 
determining if the First Amendment right of access was applicable to those 
particular proceedings.  The Court has further articulated that the proceedings 
may be closed if the negative aspect of opening the proceedings is a 
compelling government interest and the closure is accomplished in the least 
restrictive means possible.  Therefore, the Third Circuit incorrectly considered 
the negative aspects of opening deportation hearings under the logic prong of 
the analysis and, therefore, wrongly held the First Amendment access rights 
did not extend to deportation hearings. 
The Sixth Circuit used the correct method for interpreting and applying the 
Supreme Court’s Richmond Newspapers test.  The court correctly held that 
both prongs of the test were satisfied because deportation hearings have a 
sufficient history of openness and serve a functionally significant role.  After 
concluding that a First Amendment right of access applies to deportation 
hearings the court went on to analyze, under strict scrutiny, any compelling 
governmental reasons for closing the hearings.  The court correctly determined 
that closing the hearings to protect national security was a compelling 
governmental interest.  However, the court then, correctly held Creppy 
Directive was unconstitutional because it violated the strict scrutiny analysis 
because it is overbroad. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the wake of September 11, 2001, Chief Immigration Judge Michael 
Creppy and Attorney General John Ashcroft issued the Creppy Directive, 
which authorized immigration courts to restrict public access to “special 
interest” deportation hearings.  This Directive was challenged in both the Sixth 
and Third Circuits as violating the public’s First Amendment right of access.  
The Sixth Circuit, in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, held the Directive was 
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored and therefore violated 
strict scrutiny.  However a circuit split was created when the Third Circuit, in 
North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, held the Directive was constitutional, 
and therefore the public could and should be excluded from “special interest” 
deportation hearings. 
In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit correctly interpreted and applied the 
United States Supreme Court’s Richmond Newspapers analysis in determining 
the Creppy Directive violated the First Amendment and was therefore 
unconstitutional.  The court correctly held that deportation hearings were 
presumptively open after applying the test.  It also held that the government 
articulated a compelling interest of protecting national security.  However, the 
court held the Creppy Directive was unconstitutional because it was not 
narrowly tailored and therefore failed strict scrutiny.  The Third Circuit, on the 
other hand, misinterpreted and misapplied the Richmond Newspapers test in 
holding the Creppy Directive was constitutional.  Therefore, the Creppy 
Directive is unconstitutionally overbroad and is void.  However, it is clear the 
government has a compelling interest in closing deportation hearings to protect 
national security.  So, if another more restrictive directive were to be issued by 
the government, the public could be excluded from deportation hearings 
without violating the First Amendment. 
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